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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-WHEN CON­
CEPTS COLLIDE: DISPLAY PROVISIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 1 does 
not protect all forms of speech from government interference.2 While 
it is established that obscenity does not fall within the area of constitu­
tionally protected speech and press,3 the problem of identifying and 
I. The first amendment provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no law ... 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first 
amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Edwards v. 
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); GitIow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
2. "Freedom of speech ... does not comprehend the right to speak on any subject at 
any time." American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394 (1950). The 
Supreme Court has determined that the following classes of speech are not protected by the 
first amendment: fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); 
obscenity, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); and child pornography, New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
3. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Supreme Court sustained a 
conviction under a federal obscenity statute which made it unlawful to mail "obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, or filthy" material and held that "obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of 
speech and press." Id. at 479, 481 (citing 18 U.S.c. § 1461 (1955». In light of the history 
of the first amendment, the Court noted that "the unconditional phrasing of the First 
Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance." Id. at 483. Writing for the 
majority, Justice Brennan observed: 
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unortho­
dox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opin­
ion-have the full protection of the [first amendment] guaranties, unless 
excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important inter­
ests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of ob­
scenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. . . . This is the same 
judgment [previously] expressed by this Court ... : "There are certain well­
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These in­
clude the lewd and obscene . ... It has been well observed that such utterances are 
no essential part ofany exposition of ideas, and are ofsuch slight social value as a 
step to truth that any benefit . .. derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality . ..." 
Id. at 484-85 (emphasis added by Court in Roth opinion) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942». Thus, in holding that ob­
scenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech and press, the Court 
grounded its justification for excluding obscenity from first amendment protection in its 
belief that obscenity does not express "ideas," that it is not "essential" as a means of com­
munication, that it has "slight social value," and that it contributes to disorder and 
immorality. 
133 
134 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10: 133 
defining "obscenity" has proven to be an arduous task for the Supreme 
Court.4 In determining whether sexually explicit material is obscene 
and, hence, subject to government regulation, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that some material may be obscene as to minors but not as 
to adults.5 The Court embraced this concept of variable obscenity 
4. The difficulty in defining obscenity led one Supreme Court Justice to write, "I 
could never succeed in [defining it] intelligibly .... But I know it when I see it ...." 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.s. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Cases involving what 
Justice Harlan has called the "intractable obscenity problem," Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. 
City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting), have had a 
"somewhat tortured history." Miller, 413 U.S. at 20 (1973). Cf Paris Adult Theatre I v. 
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 106-07 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
The Court in Miller developed the current test to identify obscenity. Writing for the 
majority, Chief Justice Burger established a test for determining whether particular mate­
rial is "obscene" and, therefore, unprotected by the first amendment. There are three essen­
tial elements of the test: 
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community stan­
dards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest 
... , 
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value. 
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations. omitted). The Court thus reaffirmed the holding in Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), see supra note 3, that obscene material is not protected 
by the first amendment, abandoned the "utterly without redeeming social value" standard 
announced in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion), and de­
clared that obscenity is to be determined by applying "contemporary community stan­
dards," not "national standards." Miller, 413 U.S. at 37. Responding to the dissenting 
Justices' claim of repression of speech, Chief Justice Burger wrote that equating "the free 
and robust exchange of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene 
material demeans the grand conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in 
the historic struggle for freedom." Id. at 34. 
5. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the Supreme Court upheld a New 
York criminal obscenity statute that prohibited merchants from selling sexually explicit 
material to minors. Material was defined as obscene based on its appeal to minors. The 
statute did not restrict adult access to the same material. The Court observed that the 
"well-being of its children is of course a subject within the State's constitutional power to 
regulate," id. at 639, and that "it was not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure 
to material condemned by the statute is harmful to minors." Id. at 641. Justice Stewart, 
concurring, wrote that because "a child-like someone in a captive audience-is not pos­
sessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First 
Amendment guarantees," a state may deprive children of rights when deprivation of those 
same rights would be "constitutionally intolerable for adults." Id. at 649-50 (Stewart, J., 
concurring). See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) ("[T]he power of 
the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over 
adults," even when there is an invasion of freedoms otherwise protected.); Bookcase, Inc. v. 
Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 75, 271 N.Y.S.2d 947, 952, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671 (1966), appeal 
dismissed sub nom.; Bookcase, Inc. v. Leary, 385 U.S. 12 (1966) ("[M]aterial which is pro­
tected for distribution to adults is not necessarily constitutionally protected from restriction 
upon its dissemination to children .... [T]he concept of obscenity or of unprotected matter 
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when it upheld a regulation which prohibited the sale to minors of 
materials which, though not obscene as to adults, were deemed harm­
ful to minors. 6 Although the Supreme Court has upheld regulations 
which prohibit the sale or distribution to minors of obscene material,7 
the Court has never reviewed the constitutionality of provisions which 
regulate the display of sexually explicit material. 8 Because display 
provisions simultaneously restrict access to material protected as to 
adults and unprotected as to minors, they fall into a gray area of cur­
rent first amendment doctrine. 
Recent decisions by the United States Courts of Appeals for the 
Fourth9* and Eighth Circuits lO have addressed the first amendment 
may vary according to the group to whom the questionable materittl is directed or from 
whom it is quarantined."). 
6. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See supra note 5. Support for a 
variable concept of obscenity is also seen in other sources. Chief Justice Warren, concur­
ring in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), noted in dicta that present laws defining 
obscenity "depend largely upon the effect that the materials may have upon those who 
receive them," and that "the same object may have a different impact, varying according to 
the part of the community it reached." [d. at 495 (Warren, c.J., concurring). The first 
amendment rights of minors are not "co-extensive with those of adults." Tinker v. Des 
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, SIS (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring). See also 
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975) ("It is well settled that a State 
or municipality can adopt more stringent controls on communicative materials available to 
youths than on those available to adults."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 
(1944) ("[T]he power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the 
scope of its authority over adults ...."); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First 
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 939 (1963) ("The world of children is not strictly part of 
the adult realm of free expression. [This] factor of immaturity ... imposers] different 
rules. "); Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Deve/oping Constitutional 
Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 85 (1960) ("Variable obscenity ... furnishes a useful 
analytical tool for dealing with the problem of denying adolescents access to material aimed 
at a primary audience of sexually mature adults. For variable obscenity focuses attention 
upon the make-up of primary and peripheral audiences in varying circumstances, and pro­
vides a reasonably satisfactory means for delineating the obscene in each circumstance."); 
Schauer, The Return of Variable Obscenity?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1277 (1977) ("The 
basic principle of variable obscenity is that the determination of obscenity can only be made 
in the context of the material's distribution."). 
7. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
8. Display provisions, unlike the regulation upheld in Ginsberg, regulate the manner 
of display of sexually explicit material. Display provisions are designed to limit juvenile 
access to sexually explicit material that juveniles are prohibited from purchasing. The pro­
visions generally require retailers to employ one or more of the following measures: pro­
hibit juveniles from entering the store, or the portion of the store in which the material is 
displayed; use blinder racks, sealed wrappers, or opaque covers; and employ minimum 
height display restrictions. Without display provisions, juveniles could, conceivably, peruse 
material in the store that they are prohibited by law from purchasing. See also infra note 
112. 
9. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 802 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. 
granted, 107 S. Ct. 1281 (1987). 
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implications of display provisions. In each case, the court considered 
similar regulatory schemes that evoked two competing concerns: the 
state's interest in limiting juvenile access to sexually explicit material 
deemed harmful to them, and the right of adults to continued access to 
the same material. Despite the similarity between the provisions under 
review, the courts sharply disagreed on the extent to which the display 
provisions restricted adult access to sexually explicit material. The 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Upper Midwest Booksellers Associa­
tion v. City ofMinneapolis, II upheld the Minneapolis display provision 
because it did not suppress sexually explicit material and had only an 
incidental effect on adult access. In contrast, the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in American Booksellers Association v. Virginia,12 invali­
dated the Virginia display provision because it unreasonably restricted 
adult access to material protected as to adults. 
This note examines the Upper Midwest and American Booksellers 
opinions. It explores the factors that both courts considered in balanc­
ing the competing concerns raised by display provisions. Because the 
display provisions under review did not amount to a total suppression 
of protected expression, the note examines other cases in which the 
Supreme Court has assessed the first amendment implications of regu­
latory schemes that amount to a less-than-total suppression of pro­
tected expression. The note then identifies and categorizes the various 
ways in which partial bans on expression affect and limit the exercise 
* Editor's Note-On January 25, 1988, the United States Supreme Court deferred ruling 
on the constitutionality of the Virginia display provision and certified two questions to the 
Virginia Supreme Court. Virginia v. American Bookseller's Ass'n, Inc., 56 U.S.L.W. 4113 
(U.S. Jan. 25, 1988) (No. 86-1034). The two questions that the Court certified were: 
I. Does the phrase "harmful to juveniles" as used in Virginia Code §§ 18.2-390 
and 18.2-391 (1982 and Supp. 1987), properly construed, encompass any of the 
books introduced as plaintiffs' exhibits below, and what general standard should 
be used to determine the statute's reach in light of juveniles' differing ages and 
levels of maturity? 
2. What meaning is to be given the provision of Virginia Code § 18.2-391(a) 
(Supp. 1987) making it unlawful "to knowingly display for commercial purpose 
in a manner whereby juveniles may examine or peruse" certain materials? Specif­
ically, is the provision complied with by a plaintiff bookseller who has a policy of 
not permitting juveniles to examine and peruse materials covered by the statute 
and who prohibits such conduct when observed, but otherwise takes no action 
regarding the display of restricted materials? If not, would the statute be com­
plied with if the store's policy were announced or otherwise manifested to the 
public? 
Id. at 4117. 
10. Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 (8th 
Cir. 1985). 
II. 780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985). 
12. 802 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1281 (1987). 
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of first amendment rights. Finally, the note evaluates whether the dis­
play provisions in Upper Midwest and American Booksellers-as less­
than-total bans on protected expression-impermissibly limit adult ac­
cess to sexually explicit material that is protected as to adults by the 
first amendment. 
II. THE MINNEAPOLIS AND VIRGINIA DISPLAY PROVISIONS 
A. Upper Midwest Booksellers Association v. City of Minneapolis 
The Minneapolis, Minnesota, City Council enacted an ordinance 
that prohibits the distribution and open display to minors of sexually 
explicit material defined as harmful to minors. 13 In part, subsection 6 
of the ordinance makes it unlawful "commercially and knowingly" to 
display material which is "harmful to minors" in places where minors 
can examine the material, "unless each item of such material is at all 
times kept in a sealed wrapper."14 Subsection 6(a) of the ordinance 
requires an "opaque cover" on any displayed material whose "cover, 
covers, or packaging, standing alone, is harmful to minors." 15 There 
13. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CITY ORDINANCE, tit. 15, § 385.131 (1984). 
14. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CITY ORDINANCE, tit. 15, § 385.131(6)(1984). Subsec­
tion 6 provides that: 
It is unlawful for any person commercially and knowingly to exhibit, display, sell, 
offer to sell, give away, circulate, distribute, or attempt to distribute any material 
which is harmful to minors in its content in any place where minors are or may be 
present ... and where minors are able to view such material unless each item of 
such material is at all times kept in a sealed wrapper. 
Id. 
15. Id. at § 385.131(6)(a). Subsection 6(a) provides that: 
It is also unlawful for any person commercially and knowingly to exhibit, display, 
sell, ... give away, circulate, distribute, or attempt to distribute any material 
whose cover, covers, or packaging, standing alone, is harmful to minors, in any 
place where minors are or may be present or allowed to be present and where 
minors are able to view such material unless each item of such materials is 
blocked from view by an opaque cover. The requirement of an opaque cover shall 
be deemed satisfied concerning such material if those portions of the cover, cov­
ers, or packaging containing such material harmful to minors are blocked from 
view by an opaque cover. 
Id. 
The ordinance defines "harmful to minors" as: 

that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, 

sexual conduct, or sexual excitement, when it: 

(1) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful, or morbid interest of mi­
nors in sex; and 
(2) is patently offensive to contemporary standards in the adult community as a 
whole with respect to what is suitable sexual material for minors; and 
(3) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. 
Id. at § 385. 131(3)(e). 
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are two exemptions provided in the ordinance. First, if minors are not 
allowed to be present where the sexually explicit material is displayed, 
subsection 6(b) discharges the requirement of sealed wrappers or 
opaque covers.16 Second, subsections 7(a) and 7(b) exempt schools, 
religious institutions, and other specified organizations and individuals 
from liability under the ordinance. 17 
Before any enforcement action was initiated under the ordinance, 
Upper Midwest Booksellers Association, a retail trade organization, 
and an individual bookseller,18 filed suit against the City of Minneapo­
lis in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. 
The plaintiffs sought a preliminary and permanent injunction re­
straining the City from enforcing the display provisions of the 
ordinance. 19 
16. Id. at § 385.131(6)(b). Subsection 6(b) provides that: 
The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply to distribution or attempt to 
distribute the exhibition, display, sale, offer of sale, circulation, giving away of 
material harmful to minors where such material is sold, exhibited, displayed, of­
fered for sale, given away, circulated, distributed, or attempted to be distributed 
under circumstances where minors are not present, not allowed to be present, or 
are not able to view such material or the cover, covers, or packaging of such 
material. Any business may comply with the requirements of this clause by phys­
ically segregating such material in a manner so as to physically prohibit the access 
to and view of the material by minors, by prominently posting at the entrance(s) 
to such restricted area, "Adults Only-you must be 18 to enter," and by enforc­
ing said restrictions. 
Id. 
17. Id. at § 385.131(7)(a), (b). In June, 1985, the Minneapolis City Council repealed 
section 7 of the ordinance. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1408 n.*. Section 7 exempted the 
following organizations and individuals from criminal or other prosecution under the 
ordinance: 
(a) Recognized and established schools, religious institutions, museums, medi­
cal clinics and physicians, hospitals, public libraries, governmental agencies or 
quasi governmental sponsored organizations, and persons acting in their capacity 
as employees or agents of such organization. [sic] For the purpose of this section 
"recognized and established" shall mean an organization or agency having a full 
time faculty and diversified curriculum in the case of a school; a religious institu­
tion affiliated with a national or regional denomination; a licensed physician or 
psychiatrist or clinic of licensed physicians or psychiatrists; and in all other ex­
empt organizations shall refer only to income tax exempted organizations which 
are supported in whole or in part by tax funds or which receive at least one third 
of their support from publicly donated funds. 
(b) Individuals in a parental relationship with the minor. 
Id. at 1408. 
18. The Upper Midwest Booksellers Association and Harvey Hertz, the individual 
bookseller, will hereinafter be referred to collectively as the "Booksellers Association." 
19. Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 602 F. Supp. 1361, 
1363 (D. Minn. 1985). ­
The City of Minneapolis challenged the standing of the plaintiffs. They were granted 
standing because of the potential chilling effect the display provisions might have on adult 
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The Booksellers Association argued that the display provisions 
were overbroad because they restricted the first amendment rights of 
adults.20 The Association stressed that the opaque cover requirement 
restricted the ability of adults to view the cover of publications that fell 
within the scope of the ordinance. Moreover, the sealed wrapper re­
quirement "would prevent adults from thumbing through the book or 
magazine prior to deciding whether or not to purchase it," thereby 
reducing the chances that a purchase would be made.21 The district 
access. Id. at 1367-68. Under this relaxed standing requirement, it was not necessary for a 
prosecution to occur before a first amendment challenge was timely. Standing was appro­
priate as long as the ordinance "may cause others not before the court to refrain from 
constitutionally protected speech or expression." Id. at 1368 n.9 (quoting Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-13 (1973». The City of Minneapolis did not raise the stand­
ing issue on appeal. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d 1389, 1391 n.5. 
20. Upper Midwest, 602 F. Supp. at 1367. The Booksellers Association advanced 
three other arguments at the district court level. First, the Booksellers Association argued 
that the opaque cover provision was overbroad (in excess of the permissible scope of gov­
ernmental authority and, hence, unconstitutional) because the material subject to regula­
tion was not to be assessed on the basis of the work taken "as a whole." Consideration of 
the cover "standing alone," they argued, violated the first amendment. Id. at 1369. The 
district court rejected this argument, proclaiming that the "as a whole" standard was devel­
oped in the context of an outright ban on protected material and that the Minneapolis 
display provisions were an attempt to regulate the manner of display, not an attempt at 
total suppression. Id. The court stressed that "[t]he context of speech is an important 
factor in determining the scope of permissible regulation" and that "to a child who may 
never acquire and read or view the entire work, the cover of the book or magazine is the 
'work [taken] as a whole.' " Id. 
Second, the Booksellers Association argued that the provision of the ordinance ex­
empting schools and other organizations from liability violated the equal protection clause 
of the fourteenth amendment, and that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of re­
view for assessing the ordinance's classifications. The City of Minneapolis argued, unsuc­
cessfully, that the rational basis test was the appropriate standard of review and that the 
exemption provision was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. The court 
reviewed the ordinance with strict scrutiny and found that the exemption was not necessary 
to serve a compelling governmental interest because the overall scheme of the ordinance 
applied only to harmful commercial display, not non-commercial uses such as sex educa­
tion. The court severed the exemption provision as unconstitutional. Id. at 1373-75. 
Having determined that the exemption provision violated the equal protection clause, 
the court never reached plaintiffs' third argument that an exemption for a religious organi­
zation constituted an establishment of religion in violation of the first and fourteenth 
amendments. Id. at 1367 n.7. 
21. Upper Midwest, 602 F. Supp. at 1370. The Booksellers Association also argued 
that the ordinance would reduce adult access to protected materials because retailers, wary 
of potential prosecution, would self-censor their merchandise, thereby depriving adults of 
access to protected materials. The district court rejected this argument, summarily reason­
ing that the scienter component of the ordinance, which required that violations of its 
provisions be "knowing ... undercuts the argument that retailers would practice self-cen­
sorship." Id. at 1372-73. 
The Booksellers Association also argued that the ordinance was an impermissible 
time, place, and manner regulation because it was not content-neutral. Id. at 1370-71. The 
district court rejected this argument, stating that content-based time, place, and manner 
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court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, upheld the display provisions, 
and denied the plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief. 22 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court 
decision and stated that the City of Minneapolis had "struck an appro­
priate balance between its legitimate interest in the protection of its 
young and allowing adults access to material protected under the First 
Amendment."23 The Booksellers Association again argued: (1) that 
the opaque cover requirement was invalid as overbroad because the 
material subject to regulation must be identified on the basis of the 
work taken as a whole, not on the basis of the cover standing alone;24 
(2) that the display provision was an impermissible time, place, or 
manner restriction because it unreasonably restricted adult access to 
material protected as to adults under the first amendment;25 and 
(3) that the display provision did not qualify as a permissible time, 
place, or manner restriction because it was not content-neutra1.26 
Writing for the majority, Judge Bowman observed that in order 
for the ordinance under review to be invalid, its overbreadth must be 
both "real" and "substantial" in relation to the permissible sweep of 
the ordinance.27 The display provision, therefore, had to be "substan­
tially overbroad" in order for the court to invalidate it on its face. 28 
Judge Bowman considered whether the Minneapolis ordinance defined 
regulations are permissible if they further a significant government interest, are narrowly 
tailored, and impose only a minimal burden on first amendment rights. Id. 
22. Upper Midwest, 602 F. Supp. at 1376. 
23. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1395. 
24. Id. at 1392-94. 
25. Id. at 1394-96. 
26. Id. at 1396-98. The Booksellers Association also argued that the district court 
committed reversible error by severing subsection 7(a) from the ordinance after having 
determined that it violated the equal protection clause. The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit ruled that severance of the exemption provision was appropriate because, 
even without the exemption, the overall scheme of the ordinance was still intact. Id. at 
1398-99. See supra note 20. 
27. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1391-92 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 V.S. 747, 
770 (1982». Overbreadth analysis focuses on the extent to which an arguably permissible 
regulatory scheme (such as display provisions designed to protect juveniles from the harm­
ful effects of sexually explicit materials) has an impact upon activity protected under the 
first amendment (such as adult access to sexually explicit material). A regulation is over­
broad if it reaches beyond its intended scope and has a chilling effect on protected activity. 
Overbreadth challenges can be brought on behalf of those not before the court when poten­
tial or actual enforcement of the regulation may serve to deter the exercise of first amend­
ment rights. See Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. I; Redish, The Warren 
Court. the Burger Court and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. V.L. 
REV. 1031 (1983); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 
844 (1970). 
28. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1392. 
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the material subject to regulation in a manner consistent with the defi­
nition of obscenity approved in Ginsberg v. New York 29 and Miller v. 
California. 30 He found that the ordinance's definition of mat~rial 
harmful to minors was substantially the same as the definition of vari­
able obscenity approved in Ginsberg, and modified in Miller. That def­
inition allowed for greater state regulation to shield juveniles from 
material otherwise protected by the first amendment. 31 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also reviewed whether the 
display provision was a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction 
on speech otherwise protected under the first amendment.32 The court 
of appeals, like the district court, considered whether the display pro­
vision sought to further "significant governmental interests,"33 was 
"reasonably structured" to further those interests,34 and left open 
" 'adequate alternative channels of communication' " with only inci­
dental effects on continued adult access.35 
The court observed that although obscene material is not pro­
tected by the first amendment, the material subject to regulation under 
29. 390 u.s. 629 (1968). 
30. 413 U.s. 15 (1973). 
31. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1392. The court then considered whether the Min­
neapolis display provision was invalid because the material subject to regulation was to be 
assessed on the basis of the cover standing alone. The Booksellers Association argued that 
material subject to regulation must be assessed on the basis of the work taken as a whole. 
Id. at 1392-93. The Booksellers Association cited Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972), 
and Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), in support of its position. The 
court rejected this argument and agreed with the district court's position that the taken "as 
a whole" requirement applied only to situations where there was an attempt to suppress 
obscene material completely or prosecute someone for its distribution. Upper Midwest, 780 
F.2d at 1393. The opaque cover provision, in regulating the manner of display, was valid 
because it did not suppress distribution of the material. Id. 
32. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1394. As a general rule, time, place, or manner 
restrictions of otherwise protected speech are permissible if the restrictions are content­
neutral, narrowly tailored, serve a significant government interest, and leave open adequate 
alternative channels for communication. See, e.g., City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 
466 U.S. 789, 803-12 (1984); Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288, 
293-94 (1984); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 
647-48 (1981). 
33. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1392-94. The court found that the Minneapolis City 
Council, believing that sexually explicit material was harmful to the development of 
juveniles into mature adults, "acted in response to what it perceive[d] to be a matter of 
serious concern ... to the well-being of the City's young," and that the City had a signifi­
cant iryterest in protecting juveniles from the harmful effects of sexually explicit material. 
Id. at 1399. The court noted that the City'S elected representatives were not necessarily 
mistaken in their perception of the problem and that "it [was] not the business of the courts 
to second-guess the wisdom or efficacy of validly enacted legislation." Id. 
34. Id. at 1395. 
35. Id. at 1396 (quoting Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76 
(1981». 
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the Minneapolis ordinance was not obscene as to adults. 36 The ordi­
nance, in regulating the display of material obscene as to juveniles but 
not obscene as to adults, presented a unique problem because, to some 
extent, it limited the ability of adults to browse through the material. 37 
The dispositive question, therefore, was whether Minneapolis had 
struck an appropriate accommodation between competing concerns: 
the. City's interest in pr.otecting juveniles and the protection afforded 
adults under the first amendment. 
The Booksellers Association again argued that the ordinance was 
an invalid time, place, or manner restriction because its incidental ef­
fect impermissibly limited "the ability of adults to visit a bookstore or 
newsstand and browse through material that is obscene as to children 
but not as to adults."38 Rejecting this argument, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals stressed that retailers were not prohibited from 
stocking and selling the material covered under the ordinance, and 
that adults could still purchase the material despite the restrictions on 
juvenile access.39 The court balanced the state's significant interest in 
protecting juveniles with the impact the ordinance had on adult ac­
cess. In doing so, the court observed that adults could still "request a 
copy of restricted material to view from a merchant," or "view any of 
the material in a free and unfettered fashion by purchasing it."40 The 
court also stated that any burden on adults was "merely an incidental 
effect of the permissible regulation and [was] minimal in its impact," 
and that the "continued availability of these materials to adults for 
purchase under the ordinance weigh[ed] strongly in favor of the ordi­
nance's constitutionality."41 The court concluded that because the 
material subject to regulation was not suppressed, and because adults 
continued to have ultimate access to the material, the ordinance left 
36. /d. at 1395. 
37. Id. 
38. /d. at 1394. 
39. Id. at 1395. The Booksellers Association argued that the display provisions, be­
cause of their impact on adult access, were invalid under the holding in Butler v. Michigan, 
352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (invalidating a Michigan statute that made it unlawful to make 
available or possess any material "tending to the corruption of the morals of youth"). The 
court distinguished Butler on the ground that the statute in Butler, which was an absolute 
prohibition on the sale of sexually explicit material, resulted in the total suppression of the 
material covered by the statute. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1395. The Minneapolis dis­
play provision did not amount to total suppression within the meaning of Butler because 
retailers were not prohibited from selling the material subject to regulation. The Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals refused to apply Butler to a "reasonably structured" display regu­
lation intended to protect juveniles which happened to simultaneously affect adults. /d. 
See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. 
40. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1395. 
41. /d. 
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open adequate alternative channels of communication to satisfy the 
requirements of the first amendment.42 
Finally, the court addressed whether the ordinance was a valid 
time, place, and manner restriction because it was not content-neu­
tra1.43 In declaring that not all content-based restrictions were in va­
lid,44 the court focused on whether the Minneapolis display provision 
was a "reasonable means" of controlling juvenile access to material 
obscene as to them.45 The court emphasized that the display provision 
merely restricted the manner and place in which sexually explicit ma­
terial could be displayed and that the City's "substantial interest in the 
well-being of its youth" supported the classification under review.46 
The display provision, in sum, did not violate the first amendment. 
Chief Judge Lay, in dissent, wrote that "no ordinance or law writ­
ten in such sweeping terms has, until today, gained constitutional ap­
42. Id. at 1396. 
43. Id. Content-neutral restrictions regulate and limit expression without considera­
tion of the message conveyed. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 793, 
803-04 (1984). See also United States Postal Servo v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 
453 U.S. 114, 126-31 (1981) (upholding a federal content-neutral statute prohibiting all 
unstamped "mailable matter" from being placed in any private-home letterbox); Heffron v. 
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding a Minne­
sota State Fair regulation that prohibited the distribution of all leaflets on fairgrounds ex­
cept from an approved booth). Content-based restrictions generally are subject to exacting 
scrutiny because of the concern that regulation of expression based on its message, ideas, or 
subject matter impliedly favors particular ideas or viewpoints. See, e.g., Police Dep't V. 
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating an ordinance that prohibited all picketing near a 
school but allowed peaceful labor picketing). For a comprehensive analysis of the content­
neutral and content-based distinction see Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amend­
ment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983). See also Stephan, The First Amendment and 
Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203 (1982); Farber, Content Regulation and the 
First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980). 
44. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1396 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 
(1982); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976». 
45. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1396. 
46. Id. In support of its position, the court observed that the material subject to 
regulation was likely to be on the " 'borderline between pornography and artistic expres­
sion' " and that the first amendment interests at stake were of less concern--or of lower 
value-than material involving the expression of social or political ideas. Id. (quoting 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976». Justice Stevens developed 
this theory of lower level speech in Young. In Young, Justice Stevens observed that there is 
a "less vital interest" in protecting sexually explicit material than in protecting the dissemi­
nation of higher level social and political expressions. Young, 427 U.S. at 61 (Stevens, J., 
plurality opinion). "[S)ociety's interest in protecting [sexually explicit) expression is of a 
wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate 
...." Id. at 70. Under this theory, adopted by some members of the Supreme Court, 
different levels of speech are thus entitled to different degrees of protection under the first 
amendment. See also F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978) (Stevens, J., 
plurality opinion) (patently offensive references "lie at the periphery of First Amendment 
concern"). 
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proval."47 He argued that the Minneapolis display provIsIon 
unreasonably encroached on the freedom of speech protected by the 
first amendment and was not "reasonably restricted to the evil" which 
it purported to address.48 Chief Judge Lay argued that "[i]n promot­
ing the morals of its youths by restricting their access to certain com­
munications ... [the City of Minneapolis] may not simultaneously 
create barriers that substantially restrict adult access to material they 
are constitutionally entitled to obtain."49 
The Chief Judge examined the opaque cover provision of the or­
dinance and the alternative restrictions of an "adults only" section or 
an "adults only" store. 50 He found that there was a "stigma" attached 
to the "adults only" label that might cause many adults-who would 
otherwise purchase the material-to "forgo exercising their first 
amendment rights to purchase non obscene literature ...."51 More­
over, booksellers, realizing that the stigma attached to the "adults 
only" display alternative would result in the loss of adult patronage, 
might choose instead to sell only that material which would not fall 
under the ordinance as harmful to minors. This approach, he argued, 
"could very easily lead to the suppression of many literary works, in­
cluding classics and other best sellers."52 
Addressing the sealed wrapper provision of the Minneapolis ordi­
nance, the Chief Judge considered whether it was a reasonable time, 
place, or manner restriction. He focused on whether Minneapolis had 
demonstrated a "significant government interest" and whether the 
sealed wrapper provision was "narrowly drawn" to further that 
47. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1399 (Lay, c.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 1403. 
50. See supra notes 15 and 16 and accompanying text for a description of these provi­
sions of the Minneapolis ordinance. 
5!. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1402 (Lay, c.J., dissenting). 
52. Id. Chief Judge Lay rejected the majority's argument that it was permissible 
under the opaque cover requirement to assess material subject to regulation on the basis of 
its cover standing alone. Relying heavily on Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 
205 (1975), Judge Lay argued that the "as a whole" evaluation requirement applied equally 
to regulations involving suppression as well as those regulating manner of display. Upper 
Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1400-01 (Lay, c.J., dissenting). His primary concern, however, was 
that the opaque cover provision also limited juvenile access to material protected as to 
juveniles-a possibility never considered by the majority. Id. at 1400. The opaque cover 
requirement did not apply to material that, as a whole, was obscene as to juveniles. Under 
the ordinance, such material was to be displayed in a sealed wrapper because, as a whole, it 
was obscene as to juveniles. The Chief Judge argued that the opaque cover requirement 
thus resulted in the "absurdity" that juveniles were prohibited from viewing the cover of 
the material on display but were still entitled to examine or buy the entire item if, taken as a 
whole, it was not obscene. Id. at 1401. 
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interest.53 
Chief Judge Lay did not dispute that Minneapolis had a legiti­
mate interest in promoting the welfare and morals of its youth by lim­
iting their access to material obscene as to juveniles. He found, rather, 
that the sealed wrapper provision was not narrowly drawn and was 
more restrictive than necessary to achieve its designated purpose. 54 
Chief Judge Lay argued that the "unavoidable collateral effect" of the 
provision was to "severely limit" the ability of adults to examine pro­
tected materials,55 because the "practical effect" of the sealed wrapper 
provision was to restrict adult access to that which is suitable for chil­
dren. 56 The sealed wrapper provision, he argued, "would either pre­
clude adults from browsing through material prior to purchase or 
would place a heavy burden on store owners to restructure their stores 
...."57 Furthermore, the dissent noted that "[t]he ordinance over­
looks the fact that the display of magazines and books plays a vital 
role in the bookseller's ability to advertise and sell its merchandise" 
and that "many adults who would be required to unseal this [sexually 
explicit] literature in public areas in order to peruse the book or maga­
zine would be embarrassed to do so. "58 The dissent concluded that 
the Minneapolis ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad because 
its impact on adult access to sexually explicit material went considera­
bly beyond its articulated purpose of protecting juveniles. 59 
B. American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Virginia 
The Virginia General Assembly amended a Virginia statute that 
made it "unlawful for any person knowingly to sell or loan to a juve­
nile" sexually explicit material defined by the statute as harmful to 
juveniles.6O The amendment made it unlawful knowingly to display 
the harmful materials "in a manner whereby juveniles may examine 
and peruse" them.61 Unlike the Minneapolis ordinance, the Virginia 
53. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1403. 
54. Id. at 1403-04. 
55. Id. at 1403. 
56. Id. at 1404. 
57. Id. 
58. [d. 
59. Id. The Chief Judge also disagreed with the majority on the severability of the 
exemption provision of the ordinance. Id. at 1404-06. Judge Lay argued that severing the 
exemption provision rendered the entire Minneapolis ordinance invalid because severance 
alone impermissibly changed the overall intended effect of the ordinance. /d. See supra 
note 20. 
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-391(a) (Supp. 1985). 
61. Id. Section 18.2-391(a) provides that: 

It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to sell or loan to a juvenile, or to 

0 
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statute did not enumerate specific methods of display-such as opaque 
covers or sealed wrappers-that would enable a merchant to comply 
with the terms of the statute. The definition of material that was 
"harmful to juveniles," however, was similar to the definition provided 
in the Minneapolis ordinance.62 
The American Booksellers Association, a retail trade associa­
tion,63 challenged the constitutionality of the amendment in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The 
Booksellers sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the en­
forcement of the amendment.64 The district court declared the 
knowingly display for commercial purpose in a manner whereby juveniles may 
examine and peruse: 
(I) Any picture, photography, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film, or 
similar visual representation or image of a person or portion of the human body 
which depicts sexually explicit nudity, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse 
and which is harmful to juveniles, or 
(2) Any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however reproduced, or 
sound recording which contains any matter enumerated in subdivision (1) of this 
subsection, or explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of 
sexual excitement, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse and which taken as a 
whole, is harmful to juveniles. 
Id. 
62. See supra note 15. Virginia .defined "harmful to juveniles" as sexually explicit 
material having a quality, in whatever form, which: 
(a) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of 
juveniles, 
(b) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a 
whole with respect to what is suitable material for juveniles, and 
(c) is, when taken as a whole, lacking in serious literary, artistic, political or 
scientific value for juveniles. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-390.6 (Supp.1985). 
63. Four other trade associations, two retail bookstores and an individual adult and 
juvenile member of the community were also named as plaintiffs [hereinafter collectively 
referred to as the "Booksellers"]. The court granted standing to the trade associations and 
bookstores but denied standing to the individual plaintiffs. American Booksellers Ass'n v. 
Strobel, 617 F. Supp. 699, 703-04 (E.D. Va. 1985). The standing arguments advanced by 
both parties were similar to those reviewed in Upper Midwest. See supra note 19. The 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that standing was appropriate because of the 
Booksellers' claim that the Virginia amendment might deter the exercise of protected first 
amendment rights. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 802 F.2d 691, 694 (4th Cir. 
1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1281 (1987). 
64. The defendants were the Commonwealth of Virginia, William K. Stover, Chief of 
Pol!ce for Arlington County, Virginia, and Charles T. Strobel, Director of Public Safety for 
the City of Alexandria, Virginia [hereinafter collectively referred to as "Virginia"]. Strobel 
was not a party to the appeal. 
The Booksellers also sought attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1988 (1982). The 
court of appeals reversed, in part, the district court's denial of the Booksellers' request for 
attorneys' fees. Attorneys' fees were, on remand, to be assessed against Virginia, but not 
against defendants Strobel and Stover. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 802 F.2d 
691,696-97 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1281 (1987). 
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amendment unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement.65 
The district court found that in order to comply with the amend­
ment, a merchant had one of four options suggested by Virginia, none 
of which were enumerated in the statute.66 A merchant could bar all 
persons under the age of eighteen from entering the store, create an 
"adults only" section, limit inventory to books and magazines not reg­
ulated under the amendment, or place all proscribed material behind a 
counter.67 The court noted that the manner in which a particular pub­
lication is displayed plays a crucial role in determining how many cop­
ies will sell. Moreover, customers generally make a purchase only 
after browsing and are reluctant to ask openly for books with a strong 
sexual content. 68 The court considered these factors and observed that 
while the intended effect of the amendment was to prevent the exami­
nation and perusal by minors of harmful material, the "unavoidable 
collateral effect" of the law was to "severely limit" the ability of adults 
to examine material protected as to them by the first amendment. 69 
Thus, the amendment was unconstitutional because it created a barrier 
which placed "substantial restrictions" upon adult access to sexually 
explicit material. 70 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, affirming the dis­
trict court, held that the display provision of the Virginia amendment 
was facially unconstitutional for overbreadth because it unreasonably 
interfered with the way in which booksellers conducted their business 
activities and unreasonably restricted adult access to materials pro­
tected under the first amendment.7 1 The court held that the most seri­
ous flaw of the amendment was its overbreadth because it had "both a 
65. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Strobel, 617 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Va. 1985). 
66. Id. at 702-03. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 702. 
69. Id. at 706. 
70. Id. at 705. The district court also considered whether the Virginia amendment 
was a valid time, place, and manner regulation. The" 'crucial question,' " according to the 
court, was whether the manner of expression sought to be regulated was" 'basically incom­
patible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.''' Id. at 706 
(quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (upholding an ordinance 
barring demonstrations near a school that would disturb or interfere with school activities 
because disruptive demonstrations were incompatible with normal school activities». The 
court held that the amendment was an invalid time, place, and manner regulation because 
it was not narrowly drawn. The display of sexually explicit material-the regulated expres­
sion-was not incompatible with the environment-retail establishments-in which it was 
displayed. Id. 
71. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 802 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. 
granted, 107 S. Ct. 1281 (1987). 
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real and substantial deterrent effect on protected expression."72 
Virginia argued on appeal that the amendment was a valid time, 
place, and manner regulation and that "compliance with the amend­
ment would not deter the exercise of first amendment rights."73 Book­
sellers, they argued, could "readily modify their display methods to 
comply with the amendment."74 The appeals court disagreed. 
The court claimed that booksellers faced a "substantial problem 
[in] attempting to comply with the amendment in ordering, reviewing, 
and displaying publications for sale" because the display methods sug­
gested by Virginia were either "insufficient to comply with the amend­
ment or unduly burdensome on the first amendment rights of 
adults. "75 The court reviewed the compliance options suggested by 
Virginia and noted that "[p]lacing 'adults only' tags on books and 
magazines or displaying the restricted material behind blinder racks76 
or on adults only shelves" would not prevent juveniles from examining 
and perusing the materials and, hence, the merchant would still be 
subject to prosecution under the amendment. 77 The other options of 
creating a separate and restricted "adults only" area, requiring sealed 
wrappers, or placing the material behind a counter would, according 
to the court, "unreasonably" and "significantly" interfere with the 
bookseller's right to sell the restricted materiaP8 and "unrealistically" 
limit adult access.79 Moreover, many adults would be hesitant to enter 
segregated-and clearly identified-"adults only" areas in order to 
make a purchase. 80 The amendment was thus unconstitutional be­
cause it "discourage[d] the exercise of first amendment rights in a real 
and substantial fashion. "81 
72. Id. at 695. 
73. Id. at 695-96. Booksellers, they argued, were still entitled to stock the inaterial 
subject to regulation. Id. at 695. 
74. Id. at 696. 
75. Id. at 696. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly disagreed with the 
holding in Upper Midwest. Id. at 696. 
76.' Blinder racks block or "blind" the cover of magazines from public view. The 
display racks either contain a shield that blocks the bottom three-quarters of a magazine's 
cover or a shield that blocks the cover entirely. The three-quarter shield allows a customer 
to read the title printed at the top of the publication without having to lift the shield. With 
a full shield, however, a customer does not know which magazines are available unless the 
shield is lifted or it identifies the publication being blocked from view. 
77. American Booksellers, 802 F.2d at 696. 
78. These potential methods of compliance interfered with the normal business prac­
tices of booksellers who previously were able to display merchandise without any 
restrictions. 
79. American Booksellers, 802 F.2d at 696. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
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III. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF DISPLAY PROVISIONS 
The display provisions under review in Upper Midwest and Amer­
ican Booksellers both regulated the manner and, to some extent, the 
place in which sexually explicit material could be displayed. Although 
both courts agreed that the display provisions placed some burden on 
adult access, they disagreed about the extent of the burden created by 
the display provisions. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
stressed that the Mimieapolis ordinance did not suppress sexually ex­
plicit material and held that the display provisions only had an inci­
dental and minimal effect on adult access.82 The Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, in contrast, struck down the Virginia amendment because 
it was unduly burdensome and' unreasonably restricted, in a real and 
substantial way, adult access to material protected as to adults. 83 Both 
opinions turned on the degree to which each court perceived that dis­
play provisions-by regulating the manner of display of material 
deemed harmful to minors-limited adult access to the same sexually 
explicit material. 84 
Display provisions, by their nature, fall into the "interstices of 
current First Amendment doctrine" because they "simultaneously af­
fect[ ] material protected in relation to one group--adults-and un­
protected in relation to another group--minors ...."85 Under current 
first amendment doctrine, obscene material is not entitled to any con­
82. See supra notes 23-46 and accompanying text. 
83. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text. 
84. The basic drafting difference between the Minneapolis and Virginia display pro­
visions did not, in and of itself, cause the different outcomes in Upper Midwest and Ameri­
can Booksellers. The Minneapolis display provision, unlike the Virginia provision, provided 
opaque covers, sealed wrappers, and "adults only" sections as specific methods of compli­
ance. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. The Virginia provision made it un­
lawful to display the material subject to regulation in a manner whereby juveniles could 
"examine and peruse" it. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. The provision did 
not "provide any potential defenses or methods of compliance." American Booksellers, 802 
F.2d at 695. The primary concern of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was the impact 
that display provisions have on adult access to sexually explicit material, not the absence of 
potential defenses or the absence of specific methods of compliance in the Virginia provi­
sion. The court in American Booksellers rejected, as unduly burdensome, the specific meth­
ods of compliance suggested by Virginia. [d. at 696. The methods of compliance would 
have been just as burdensome had they been enumerated in the statute itself. Furthermore, 
the court expressly disagreed with the holding in Upper Midwest that display provisions 
could be "legitimized" by enumerating specific display methods which would place a 
merchant in compliance with the statute. [d. at 695 n.8 (citing Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 
1390-91). 
85. Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389, 1394 
(8th Cir. 1985). 
150 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10: 133 
stitutional protection.86 In Miller v. California,87 the Supreme Court 
established the test for determining whether particular material is ob­
scene and, therefore, not protected by the first amendment. The Court 
upheld a California statute that made it unlawful to knowingly dis­
tribute material defined as "obscene."88 If material is identified as 
"obscene" under the Miller test, it is obscene as to both children and 
adults. Merchants are not only prohibited from displaying obscene 
material, they are prohibited from stocking and distributing it as well. 
In Ginsberg v. New York,89 the Supreme Court held that the defi­
nition of obscenity can. vary according to the audience at which the 
material is directed.90 Under this concept of "variable obscenity," it is 
permissible constitutionally to accord juveniles "a more restricted 
right than that assured to adults to judge and determine for themselves 
what sex material they may read or see."91 Thus, the Court in Gins­
berg upheld a New York statute that regulated the sale to juveniles­
not the manner of display-of material defined as obscene as to 
juveniles but not obscene as to adults. The statute upheld in Ginsberg 
did not affect the ability of adults to examine or purchase the sexually 
explicit material.92 
Display provisions, in theory, are designed to complement the 
concept of variable obscenity and the restriction on sales upheld in 
Ginsberg. It would seem to follow that if the state can protect 
juveniles by preventing merchants from selling them sexually explicit 
material, the state can also protect juveniles by limiting their access to 
the harmful materia1.93 Without display provisions, juveniles could 
86. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (upholding a conviction under the Cali­
fornia Penal Code for knowingly distributing material defined as obscene). 
87. Id. See supra note 4. 
88. Miller, 413 U.S. at 37. 
89. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
90. See supra notes 5-6 and 'accompanying text. 
91. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 637. In Ginsberg, a New York criminal obscenity statute 
prohibited the sale of obscene material to minors under seventeen years of age. Sexually 
explicit material was defined as obscene on the basis of its appeal to minors. The court 
upheld the conviction of a merchant who sold two sexually explicit magazines to a sixteen­
year-old boy. Id. 
92. Whereas Ginsberg expanded the definition of obscenity to encompass a broader 
range of material subject to regulation when juveniles are included in the viewing audience, 
display provisions, as an extension of Ginsberg, seek to prevent juveniles from viewing that 
material. 
93. The Supreme Court has recognized the state's interest in protec~ing minors from 
exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 
(1978). In Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986), a high school 
student delivered a speech at a high school assembly nominating another student for elec­
tive office. School officials viewed the speech, which described the candidate as a man who 
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browse through material on display that they are otherwise prohibited 
from purchasing.94 The problem, of course, is that display provisions, 
unlike the prohibition on sale upheld in Ginsberg, also affect the ability 
of adults to view and purchase the same material. 95 
.The extent to which display provisions actually limit adult access 
to sexually explicit material is the central concern of both Upper Mid­
west and American Booksellers. Without display prOVISIons, 
merchants are free to display material offered for sale as they see fit. If 
the book or magazine is on open display, a potential customer can 
examine the material and make a purchase free of any limitations. Re­
strictive display provisions, however, affect the way in which retailers 
can merchandise sexually explicit material. They also limit the ability 
of adults to visit bookstores and freely browse through material that 
they are constitutionally entitled to obtain. The extent of this burden 
on adult access to sexually explicit material, the way in which the bur-
was "firm in his pants, ... who takes his point and pounds it in" and was willing to go to 
the "climax" for his constituents, id. at 3167 (Brennan, J., concurring), as offensively lewd 
and indecent speech. Id. at 3162. The student was suspended for two days after admitting 
that he had deliberately used sexual innuendo. 
The Supreme Court, upholding the decision to suspend the student, accepted the 
school district's argument below, that it had an interest-superior to the student speaker's 
first amendment concerns-in protecting "an essentially captive audience of minors from 
lewd and indecent language." Id. at 3163. The Court pointed out that there are "limita­
tions on the otherwise absolute interest of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience 
where the speech is sexually explicit and the audience may include children." Id. at 3165. 
The Court was thus unwilling to extend first amendment protection to the speech because it 
was presented in a public school. 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan stressed that the Fraser opinion was limited 
only to the school's authority to regulate the language used in the school environment and 
not to public debate outside of the school. Id. at 3167 n.l (Brennan, J., concurring). This 
statement is important because both Fraser and Ginsbe'6'-unlike Upper Midwest and 
American Booksellers-involved a predominantly juvenile audience. Fraser was confined to 
protecting juveniles and had no collateral effect on the ability of adults to hear protected 
speech. Thus, although Fraser illustrates the extent to which Ginsbe'6' can be extended to 
protect juveniles from sexually explicit speech, Fraser does not address the concerns raised 
by display provisions. Adults are not the primary audience at public school assemblies as 
they are at stores that stock sexually explicit material. They are not affected by the type of 
prohibition upheld in Fraser. However, adults are confronted unavoidably by the burdens 
associated with display provisions. 
94. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania expressed the view that regulating the sale 
of sexually explicit material to minors without simultaneously controlling the commercial 
display of the material would seem to render efforts to protect juveniles meaningless. 
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Rendell, 332 Pa. Super. 537, 581-82, 481 A.2d 919, 942 
(1984). 
95. The Supreme Court has had great difficulty with "hybrid regulations" such as 
display provisions which involve government limitations on speech in a specific context. 
Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature ofPublic Forum Analysis: Content and Context 
in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1219 (1984). 
152 	 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:133 
den is to be characterized and measured, and the extent to which the 
burden can be tolerated, remain unclear after Upper Midwest and 
American Booksellers. 
A. 	 Regulations That Result in the Total Suppression of a Category 
of Protected Expression 
Display provisions do not suppress completely the availability of 
sexually explicit material. The Supreme Court has held that regula­
tions that result in the total suppression of a category of protected 
expression violate the first amendment.96 In Butler v. Michigan,97 the 
Supreme Court reviewed a Michigan statute that made it unlawful, in 
any setting, to make available or possess any material "tending to the 
corruption of the morals of youth ...."98 The statute prohibited 
adults and minors from distributing or possessing the material subject 
to regulation. The Supreme Court invalidated the statute because its 
result was "to reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading only 
what is fit for children."99 The statute, in effect, suppressed material 
that adults were entitled to obtain.loo 
Similarly, in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,101 the Court 
reviewed a zoning ordinance that prohibited all live entertainment in 
any establishment in the borough. \02 The operators of an adult estab­
lishment were convicted of violating the ordinance when they installed 
a coin-operated booth that permitted customers to watch live nude 
96. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73-74 (1983); Schad v. 
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65-68 (1981); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 
383 (1957). . 
97. 	 352 U.S. 380 (1957). 
98. 	 Id. at 381. 
99. 	 Id. at 383. 
100. See also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). In Bolger, 
the Supreme Court invalidated a federal statute which barred the unsolicited mailing of 
advertisements for contraceptives. The government asserted an interest in assisting parents 
in their efforts to discuss birth control with their children when they saw fit. Although the 
court found a substantial governmental interest in preventing unsolicited home intrusions 
and helping parents, the statute was invalid because it was far more restrictive than neces­
sary. The statute shut down the flow of the unsolicited mailings and blocked advertise­
ments that were suitable for adults. The court proclaimed that the "level of discourse 
reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a sand­
box." Id. at 74. 
101. 452 U.S. 61 (1981). See also Note, Municipalities May Not Exclude Live En
tertainment From Areas Zoned for Commercial Uses: Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 
86 DICK. L. REV. 391 (1982); Note, Zoning Prohibition Which Impinges Upon First 
Amendment Activity Must be Adequately Justified by Municipality, 12 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 311 (1982). 
102. 	 Schad, 452 U.S. at 62. 
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dancers perform behind a glass panel. 103 The borough argued that the 
ordinance permissibly suppressed live entertainment because adults 
still had ample opportunity to view such entertainment in neighboring 
communities. 104 The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, empha­
sizing that "when a zoning law infringes upon a protected liberty, it 
must be narrowly drawn and must further a sufficiently substantial 
government interest."105 The ordinance significantly limited a pro­
tected activity by banning live entertainment, including nude dancing, 
and made it necessary for adults to go outside of the borough to see 
live entertainment. As a result, the Supreme Court scrutinized the 
"interests advanced by the Borough to justify this limitation on pro­
tected expression and the means chosen to further those interests."106 
The ordinance was invalid because the Borough failed to justify ade­
quately its "substantial restriction of protected activity"107 and to es­
103. Id. at 62-64. 
104. Id. at 76. The Court rejected this argument, stressing that protected expression, 
otherwise appropriate in one location, could not be suppressed in the borough merely be­
cause it was possible to exercise the right elsewhere. Id. at 76-77 (citing Schneider v. State, 
308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939». 
105. Schad, 452 U.S. at 68. Although the Court observed that live entertainment is 
expression protected by the first amendment, id. at 65, and that "nude dancing is not 
without its First Amendment protections from official regulation," id. at 66, the Court did 
not resolve the status of nude dancing within the protection of the first amendment. Be­
cause the Mount Ephraim ordinance prohibited all live entertainment in the Borough and 
not only nude dancing, the Court addressed only the broader question of the status of live 
entertainment under the first amendment. 
Recently, in City of Newport v. Iacobucci, 107 S. Ct. 383 (1986) (per curium summary 
disposition), the Supreme Court upheld a Newport, Kentucky, ordinance that prohibits 
"nude or nearly nude" dancing in establishments licensed to sell liquor for consumption on 
the premises. The ordinance was promulgated under the state's broad power under the 
twenty-first amendment to regulate the sale of liquor within its boundaries. The City of 
Newport determined that the combination of nude dancing and serving liquor was harmful 
to the residents of the city. Id. at 386. The ordinance was designed to stabilize neighbor­
hoods and reduce "crime, disorderly conduct and juvenile delinquency." Id. Stressing that 
there is a presumption that regulations under the twenty-first amendment are valid, the 
Court noted that Newport's "interest in maintaining order outweighs the interest in free 
expression by dancing nude." Id. See also New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 
U.S. 714,717 (1981) (per curium summary disposition) ("The State's power to ban the sale 
of alcoholic beverages entirely includes the lesser power to ban the sale of liquor on prem­
ises where topless dancing occurs."); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972) (state 
power under the twenty-first amendment to regulate the sale of liquor outweighs any first 
amendment interest in nude dancing). Justice Stevens dissented in Iacobucci because of the 
"blatantly incorrect" reasoning that the "Twenty-first Amendment shields restrictions on 
speech from full First Amendment review." Iacobucci, 107 S. Ct. at 386 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
106. Schad, 452 U.S. at 71. 
107. Id. at 72. The Borough argued that the ordinance was necessary to further its 
substantial interest in creating commercial zones that would cater to the "immediate 
needs" of its residents. Id. at 72-73. Rejecting this argument, the Court found that the 
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tablish that its interests could not be met by less intrusive 
restrictions. 108 
The ordinances under review in Butler and Schad were invalid 
because they amounted to total suppression of a category of protected 
expression. The Minneapolis and Virginia display provisions, in con­
trast, merely regulate the manner in which sexually explicit material 
can be displayed. The provisions do not suppress completely the ma­
terial subject to regulation. 109 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Upper Midwest stressed that the material continued to be available in 
Minneapolis and that adults were free to purchase any of the regulated 
material. 110 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
American Booksellers held that the Virginia display provisions unrea­
sonably interfered with adults' ability to buy the restricted material. 
The court, however, did not find that there was total suppression of 
sexually explicit material in Virginia. I II Under this analysis, display 
provisions, unlike the ordinances struck down in Butler and Schad, 
amount to a less-than-total restriction of a category of protected 
expression. 
B. 	 Regulations That Result in the Partial Restriction of a Category 
ofProtected Expression 
As previously noted, the Supreme Court has never considered 
whether display provisions-as less-than-total restrictions on pro­
tected expression-place an impermissible burden on adult access to 
sexually explicit material. I 12 The Court has, however, had occasion to 
immediate commercial needs of the residents were met already and would not be reduced 
by having live entertainment in the commercial zone. Id. Moreover, the Court found that 
the range of "permitted uses" in the commercial zones, such as motels, lumber stores, 
offices and car showrooms, far exceeded the "immediate needs" of the residents, rendering 
the Borough's "immediate needs" argument "patently insufficient." Id. at 73. The borough 
also argued that the ban on live entertainment would avoid the problem of the extra burden 
on municipal serVices created by live entertainment. The Court rejected this argument 
because there was no evidence that live entertainment created greater parking, trash, or 
police problems than other existing businesses. Id. 
108. 	 Id. at 74. 
109. Chief Judge Lay, dissenting in Upper Midwest, argued that the "practical effect" 
of the sealed wrapper provision was equivalent to the ordinance in Butler because it re­
stricted adult reading to that which was suitable for children. Upper Midwest Booksellers 
Ass'n v.City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389, 1404 (8th Cir. 1985) (Lay, C,J., dissenting). 
See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
110. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1395. 

Ill. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 792 F.2d 1261, 1266 (4th Cir. 1986). 

112. At least eleven other state and federal courts, aside from Upper Midwest and 
American Booksellers, have reviewed display provisions. The cases provide little or no 
guidance in assessing the Minneapolis and Virginia display provisions. In M.S. News Co. 
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consider the impact on protected expression of regulatory schemes 
that amount to less-than-total restrictions. 113 In these cases, the 
Supreme Court considers a variety of factors to determine whether the 
regulatory scheme impermissibly burdens protected expression. 114 
v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1983), American Booksellers Ass'n v. Rendell, 332 Pa. 
Super. 537, 481 A.2d 919 (1984), and Capital News Co. v. Nashville, 562 S.W.2d 430 
(Tenn. 1978), display provisions required sexually explicit material to be displayed behind a 
blinder rack or opaque cover. The display provisions under review in each case were con­
siderably less restrictive than the Minneapolis and Virginia display provisions. 
Several courts have struck down display provisions that regulated material protected 
as to adults and children. In each of these cases the definition of "harmful to minors" was 
overbroad because it did not conform to the standards enunciated in Miller and Ginsberg. 
See Rushia v. Town of Ashburnham, 582 F. Supp. 900 (D. Mass. 1983) (invalidating a 
display regulation as constitutionally overbroad because it regulated material not obscene 
as to juveniles); American Booksellers Ass'n v. McAuliffe, 533 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Ga. 1981) 
(same); Hillsboro News Co. v. City of Tampa, 451 F. Supp. 952 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (ordi­
nance restricting display of "offensive sexual material" found unconstitutionally vague); 
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. App. 3d 97, 181 Cal. Rptr. 33 
(1982) (ordinance overbroad because it required material containing any photo whose pri­
mary purpose was sexual arousal to be sealed regardless of whether it was obscene as to 
minors); Tattered Cover, Inc. v. Tooley, 696 P.2d 780 (Colo. 1985) (invalidating display 
provision as overbroad because it was inconsistent with the standard enunciated in Gins­
berg); Dover News, Inc. v. City of Dover, 117 N.H. 1066, 381 A.2d 752 (1977) (invalidat­
ing ordinance prohibiting the display below sixty vertical inches of sexually explicit 
material defined as harmful to juveniles because the definition included material protected 
as to juveniles); Calderon v. City of Buffalo, 61 A.D.2d 323, 402 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1978) 
(invalidating the "Anti-Obscenity And Display To Minors Ordinance" as overbroad be­
cause it prohibited sale and exhibition of material not obscene as to either juveniles or 
adults); Oregon v. Frink, 60 Or. App. 209, 653 P.2d 553 (1982) (statute prohibiting dissem­
ination of all nudity to minors was overbroad because it failed to limit prohibition to mate­
rial obscene as to juveniles). 
113. "Less-than-total" restriction here refers to those regulatory schemes that pur­
port to leave open alternative channels of communication. See, e.g., City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1663 (1986); City 
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); United States Postal Servo V. Coun­
cil of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981); F.C.C. V. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 
726 (1978); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Young V. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Erznoznik V. City of Jacksonville, 422 
U.S. 205 (1975); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
114. Although the Court has never expressly categorized the various types of bur­
dens that limit protected expression, several categories of burdens are readily identifiable. 
The various forms of less-than-total restrictions that the Supreme Court has analyzed can 
be categorized as follows: first, restrictions that suppress a "uniquely valuable" or "impor­
tant" mode or method of communication within a category of expression, without impos­
ing a total ban on that category of expression, City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 
U.S. 789 (1984) (ordinance prohibiting posters on public property without banning other 
modes or methods of conveying the same message), Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Wil­
lingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (ordinance prohibiting house "For Sale" signs without ban­
ning other methods of advertising houses for sale); second, restrictions that result in fewer 
overall opportunities for access by limiting the locations at which access takes place, City of 
Renton V. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1663 (1986) 
(concentrating location of adult establishments), Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 
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These various forms of less-than-total restrictions on protected expres­
sion-and the manner in which the Supreme Court has characterized 
their impact-are useful in assessing the impact of display provisions 
on adult first amendment rights. 
Although the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Eighth Cir­
cuits purported to assess the impact of display provisions on adult first 
amendment rights, the courts did so without identifying and catego­
rizing the ways in which display provisions limit adult access to sexu­
ally explicit material. Both courts failed to identify adequately and 
assess the types of burdens associated with display provisions. They 
also failed to explore the way in which the Supreme Court has viewed 
similar burdens in contexts that implicate the first amendment. The 
courts thus reached different conclusions about the burdens associated 
with display provisions without providing a proper framework for as­
sessing those burdens. 
1. Uniquely Valuable or Important Modes of Communication 
The Supreme Court has stated that although the first amendment 
does not guarantee the right to use every imaginable means of commu­
nication in all places at all times,115 a restriction that bans a "uniquely 
valuable or important mode of communication" may be invalid if it 
threatens the ability to communicate protected expression effec­
tively.116 In City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,117 the Court up­
427 U.S. 50 (1976) (dispersing location of adult theaters), or the format through which or 
the time at which access takes place, F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (limit­
ing method and time of access to indecent, non-obscene language); third, restrictions that 
result in increased financial burdens on distributors, recipients, or customers of protected 
expression, United States Postal Servo V. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 
(1981) (increased cost of mailing civic association notices and pamphlets), Erznoznik V. 
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (increased cost of showing drive-in movies); and 
fourth, restrictions that deter access by stigmatizing a form of protected expression, La­
mont V. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (restrictions which stigmatize protected ex­
pression such as communist propaganda deter the exercise of first amendment rights). 
115. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 
(1981). The Court has observed that the "guarantees of the First Amendment have never 
meant 'that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right 
to do so whenever and however and wherever they please.''' Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 
836 (1976) (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,48 (1966)). 
116. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984). A restriction 
that bans a uniquely valuable or important mode of communication is not synonymous 
with an outright ban on a category of expression. The former bans only a particular means 
for conveying a message. The latter bans a class of expression, such as political speech, and 
in doing so, necessarily bans the means of communication with respect to that class of 
expression. The possibility exists, of course, that a particular way of communicating a cate­
gory of expression can be so valuable or important to that category that a ban on that 
method can amount to a ban on the category of expression. 
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held a City ordinance that prohibited the posting of signs on public 
property. The City enforced the ordinance by "routinely remov[ing] 
all signs attached to utility poles," including posters attached by the 
supporters of a political candidate. I IS 
Political supporters argued that the posting of political posters on 
public property was a "uniquely valuable or important mode of com­
munication" and that the ordinance was invalid because it restricted 
their ability to communicate their message effectively.119 Other modes 
of communication, they argued, were not effective alternatives for con­
veying the same political message. 120 The Court rejected this argu­
ment, observing that posting signs on public property did not have 
communicative advantages over other forms of expression such as 
posting signs on private property.l2l Because the supporters could 
still convey the same message adequately through the alternatives of 
picketing, parading, distributing handbills, and carrying signs or post­
ing them on private property, the ban on postings on public property 
did not restrict a "uniquely valuable" or "important" mode of 
communication. 122 
In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,123 how­
ever, the Court invalidated a township ordinance that prohibited the 
display of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs in front of private homes. 124 
The township argued that the restriction was valid because it re­
stricted only one method of communication and left open "ample al­
117. 466 u.s. 789 (1984). 
118. Id. at 793. The city argued that the ordinance furthered the substantial govern­
ment interests of advancing aesthetic values by reducing clutter and visual blight, and pro­
moting traffic safety by removing potential distractions and view obstructions. Id. at 794­
95. The ordinance was not designed to single out and suppress particular ideas that the city 
found distasteful. The city uniformly applied the ordinance and removed all signs on pub­
lic property. Id. at 804. For a discussion of Vincent and the promotion of aesthetics as a 
legitimate state interest see Quadres, Content-Neutral Public Forum Regulations: The Rise 
of the Aesthetic State Interest. the Fall ofJudicial Scrutiny, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 439 (1986). 




123. 431 U.S. 85 (1977). 
124. Id. at 86-87. The township argued that the ban on real estate signs was neces­
sary to help check the flow of white homeowners from the community. Id. at 88. The 
Court rejected this argument because there was no evidence that whites were leaving Wil­
lingboro in substantial numbers. Id. at 95. The Township Council believed that the signs 
were a "major catalyst" of the fear that the white population of the township was decreas­
ing and that a decrease in the number of signs would reduce panic selling and "white 
flight." Id. at 88. Rejecting this "assumption," the Court observed that banning signs 
might achieve the opposite result by "fuel[ing) public anxiety over sales activity by increas­
ing homeowners' dependence on rumor and surmise." Id. at 96 n.lO. 
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ternative channels for communication."125 The Court disagreed. 
Although the restriction imposed was less-than-total, the only options 
that were realistic alternatives, such as newspaper advertisements and 
listings with real estate agents, were unsatisfactory.126 These alterna­
tives' were far less effective than a "For Sale" sign posted in a front 
yard. 127 Moreover, the alternative methods of communication were far 
less likely to reach those who were not seeking sales information. 128 
Without "For Sale" signs, impulse buyers, most likely, would be una­
ware that a particular house was available and, thus, would not in­
quire about its purchase. Therefore, the Court viewed "For Sale" 
signs as a unique and important method of communication and pro­
tected their use. 
In Vincent and Linmark, the Court proclaimed that a less-than­
total restriction on communication may be invalid if the mode of com­
munication is uniquely valuable or important in order to convey a par­
ticular message. The availability of alternative means of 
communication will not validate the restriction if the mode of commu­
nication restricted is so essential that without it, the message cannot be 
conveyed effectively.129 
Dissenting ilJ. Upper Midwest, Chief Judge Lay observed that a 
merchant's ability to sell a particular publication is related directly to 
125. Id. at 93 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun­
cil, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976». 
126. Alternatives such as leaflets, sound trucks, and demonstrations were also un­
realistic because they were not methods through which real estate traditionally is adver­
tised and were, thus, unlikely to be successful. Linmark, 431 U.S. at 93. 
127. Real estate agents reported that it took twice as long to sell a piece of real estate 
without a "For Sale" sign on the property. Id. at 89. 
128. Id. at 93. 
129. The Court made this determination in Vincent and Linmark without serious 
consideration of the category of speech involved. It struck down the ordinance in Linmark 
even though the ordinance involved commercial speech, a category of speech generally not 
entitled to the highest degree of first amendment protection. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770-72 (1976) (commer­
cial speech, while not excluded entirely from the scope of the first amendment, is not enti­
tled to as much protection as other types of speech). The Court upheld the ordinance in 
Vincent, however, even though it involved core political speech, generally entitled to the 
fullest possible measure of first amendment protection. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n 
v. Massachusetts'Citizens for Life, Inc., \07 S, Ct. 616, 631 (1986) (political speech war­
rants the highest degree of first amendment protection); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 58 
(1982) (the first amendment affords political speech "unequivocal protection"). See also H. 
BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 46 (1969) (Protection of political speech "was no 
doubt a strong reason for the [First] Amendment's passage."). See also supra note 46. 
Nothing in the Supreme Court's analyses in Vincent and Linmark suggests that it would be 
unwilling to apply the concept of a uniquely valuable or important mode of communication 
to sexually explicit speech. 
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the way in which the publication is displayed. Most publications, he 
stressed, "are purchased only after a potential reader has had an op­
portunity to peruse the book or magazine's contents."130 If a potential 
customer is unable to see or browse through a publication while shop­
ping because of an opaque cover or sealed wrapper, it is less likely that 
he or she will make a purchase. l3I Because the open display of sexu­
ally explicit material has advantages over other modes of communica­
tion and cannot be duplicated through other means,132 the 
Minneapolis and Virginia display provisions are comparable to the re­
striction struck down in Linmark. 
Potential customers of sexually explicit material are like the im­
pulse home buyers in Linmark-if they are unaware of what is avail­
able, they are unlikely to buy it. Like the ban on "For Sale" signs in 
Linmark, but unlike the ban on signs in Vincent, display provisions 
such as opaque covers and sealed wrappers restrict a uniquely valuable 
and important mode of communication, the effect of which is not eas­
ily duplicated merely because there are available alternatives. 
2. Reduced Opportunity for Access 
The Supreme Court has examined restrictions that limit the 
number of locations at which protected communication can take 
place,133 or the format through which or the time at which the com­
munication can be made.134 In Federal Communications Commission 
v. Pacifica Foundation, 135 Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 136 
130. Upper Midwest Booksel1ers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389, 1404 
(8th Cir. 1985) (Lay, c.J., dissenting). 
13\. See Lynn, Polluting the Censorship Debate: A Summary and Critique of the 
Final Report of the Attorney General's Comm'n on Pornography, A.C.L.U. PUB. POL'y 
REP. 99 (1986) ("Most laws regarding the shielding of covers are highly dangerous to First 
Amendment interests. When an opaque wrapper covers the front of ... [a magazine], not 
only does the potential consumer not see a scantily clad woman, but he or she also does not 
see what articles are there. "). 
132. See text accompanying supra notes 57-58. 
133. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), reh'g denied, 
\06 S. Ct. 1663 (1986); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
134. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
135. Id. See generally Note, Broadcasting Seven Dirty Words: FCC v. ·Pacifica 
Found., 20 B.C.L. REV. 975 (1979); Note, Regulation of Programming Content to Protect 
Children After Pacifica, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1377 (1979); Note, Constitutional Law -First 
Amendment-FCC May Regulate Broadcast ofNon-Obscene Speech, 53 TuL. L. REV. 273 
(1978). 
136. 429 U.S. 50 (1976). See generally Note, Zoning, Adult Movie Theatres and the 
First Amendment: An Approach to Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 5 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 379 (1977); Comment, Municipal Zoning Ordinance May Restrict Location of Adult 
Motion Picture Theatres, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 479 (1977). 
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and City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 137 the Supreme Court 
examined less-than-total restrictions on nonobscene, sexually explicit 
speech. In each case, the Court assessed the impact of the restriction 
on protected expression. 
Regulations that limit the format through which or the time at 
which access to protected expression can occur are not necessarily in­
valid. In Pacifica, the Supreme Court reviewed a Federal Communi­
cations Commission declaratory order that prohibited a radio station 
from broadcasting a monologue that was indecent, but not obscene, 
during a time of day when children were likely to be exposed to. the 
broadcast. J38 The Commission characterized the monologue as "pa­
tently offensive" and sought to protect children from its harmful ef­
fects.139 The radio station argued that because the monologue was not 
obscene, the first amendment prohibited the government from restrict­
ing the public broadcast of language that was merely indecent. 140 The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and upheld the Commission's 
declaratory order. 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell stressed that although the 
restriction might limit the times at which adults could hear the mono­
logue, its effect would not limit the opportunity of adults to hear only 
that which was fit for children. 141 Adults could still purchase Carlin's 
monologue at record stores, attend live Carlin performances, or read 
"the transcript [of the monologue] reprinted as an appendix to the 
Court's opinion."142 Moreover, Pacifica was not prohibited from 
broadcasting the monologue late in the evening when children were 
less likely to be in the broadcasting audience. 143 
Although the restriction upheld in Pacifica made it less likely that 
137. 475 U.S. 41 (1986), reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1663 (1986). See generally Com· 
ment, The Conflict Between the First Amendment and Ordinances Regulating Adult Estab­
lishments, 30 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 315, 319-31 (1986). 
138. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731-32. The Commission had acted in response to a com­
plaint from a father who heard an afternoon broadcast of George Carlin's "Filthy Words" 
monologue while driving with his young son. !d. at 729-30. 
139. Id. at 731. The Commission's "primary concern was to prevent the broadcast 
[of the monologue] from reaching the ears of unsupervised children" who were likely to be 
listening to the radio during the afternoon hours. Id. at 757 (Powell, J., concurring). If the 
monologue were broadcast late at night it would be less likely that children would be ex­
posed to it. Id. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring). 
140. Id. at 744. 
141. Id. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 
(1957». 
142. Id. 
143. Id. The Commission's holding, on its face, and the Court's opinion, only ad­
dressed the question of broadcasting the monologue during the day. 
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adults would hear Carlin's monologue on the radio, there were other 
formats through which adults could obtain access to the monologue. 
Display provisions ·also amount to a less-than-total restriction on adult 
access to sexually explicit material protected as to adults. Display 
provisions, and the broadcasting restriction in Pacifica, are both 
designed to protect children from exposure to sexually explicit mate­
rial that is harmful to them by restricting access to expression. l44 
Both restrictions leave untouched other formats through which the 
same expression can occur.14S For instance, in Pacifica, although 
adults are unable to hear the Carlin monologue at certain times on the 
radio, the expression is available in other formats, such as records or a 
printed transcript. Likewise, although display provisions prevent 
adults from having wholly unimpeded access to sexually explicit mate­
rial, the material remains available in different formats, such as 
"adults only" stores or with an opaque cover or in a sealed wrapper. 
The Supreme Court also has addressed regulations that limit the 
locations at which protected expression can occur. In Young, the 
Court upheld a Detroit zoning ordinance that sought to preserve and 
stabilize neighborhoods by dispersing the location of adult theaters. 146 
The Court noted that the restriction on the location of theaters im-' 
posed a minimal burden on protected speech because although adult 
theaters were dispersed, their total numbers were not reduced and the 
market for the commodity was "essentially unrestrained."147 The 
144. This comparison, however, is not without limitations. The Court in Pacifica 
emphasized the "narrowness" of the holding, Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750, explaining that 
radio broadcasting has a "uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans" and 
that it is "uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read." Id. at 748-49. 
Moreover, broadcasting has "received the most limited First Amendment protection." Id. 
at 748. Radio broadcasts, unlike material on display in a bookstore, confront individuals in 
the privacy of the home, involve a potentially captive audience, and are uniquely accessible 
to young children. Radio broadcasts are thus subject to greater regulation than other 
modes of communication. As the Court observed in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 
463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983), "[priOI'] decisions have recognized that the special interest of the 
Federal Government in regulation of the broadcast media does not readily translate into a 
justification for regulation of other means of communication." Id. at 74 (footnote omitted). 
145. A notable distinction is that the display provisions in Upper Midwest and Ameri­
can Booksellers apply under all circumstances where children may have access to sexually 
explicit material, while the restriction in Pacifica applies only during certain times of day. 
146. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 50 (1976). Those theaters 
which exhibited sexually explicit films were classified as "adult" theaters. Adult theaters 
had to satisfy a location restriction not applicable to other types of theaters. The zoning 
ordinance prohibited a new adult theater from being located within 500 feet of a residential 
area. Id. at 52. The Detroit City Council had determined that "some uses of property 
[such as adult entertainment] are especially injurious to a neighborhood when they are 
concentrated in limited areas." Id. at 54. 
147. Id. at 62. 
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zoning ordinance was valid because it served "the city's interest in 
preserving the character of its neighborhoods"148 and was minimal in 
terms of first amendment impact. The Court in Young warned, how­
ever, that "the situation would be quite different if the ordinance had 
the effect ,of suppressing, or greatly restricting. access to, lawful 
speech." 149 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell stressed that the "central 
concern of the First Amendment in this area is that there be a free 
flow [of expression] from creator to audience," and that the public 
maintain free access to the expression. ISO He concluded that the im­
148.. Id. at 71. The Court upheld the ordinance despite the fact that the determina­
tion of whether a particular theater was an "adult" theater turned on the content of the 
films exhibited at that theater. Young is thus an "exception[ ] to the general rule prevent­
ing government regulation based upon the content of speech." Schauer, Fear, Risk and the 
First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.L. REV. 685, 715 n.l44 (1978). 
In Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), the Supreme Court emphasized that the 
"First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of 
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Id. at 95. See also Cohen v. Cali­
fornia, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). The Court in Young observed that if this statement was 
"read literally" it would "absolutely preclude any regulation of expressive activity predi­
cated in whole or in part on the content of the communication." Young, 427 U.S. at 65. 
The Court in Young chose not to read the statement literally because "a difference in con­
tent may require a different governmental response." Id. at 66. The government, however, 
must remain neutral without regulating on the basis of "sympathy or hostility" for a partic­
ular message. Id. at 67. 
The zoning ordinance in Young was a reaction to the concern that a concentration of 
"adult" theaters in the same area would attract "undesirable" transients, reduce property 
values, increase crime, and cause residents and businesses to flee from the neighborhood. 
Id. at 55. The ordinance was upheld because it was these "secondary effect[sl" which the 
ordinance sought to avoid, not the dissemination of sexually explicit speech. Id. at 71 n.34. 
Disparate treatment of adult theaters was thus justified by a "compelling public interest" in 
the preservation and stabilization of neighborhoods and unrelated to the suppression of 
expression based on content. Id. at 57 n.14 (quoting American Mini Theatres v. Gibbs, 518 
F.2d 1014, 1020 (6th Cir. 1975)). Cf Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 
(1975), in which the justifications offered by the city for regulating drive-in theaters rested 
primarily on a government interest in protecting citizens from unwanted exposure to 
nudity, not its secondary effects. The Court invalidated the regulation because the impact 
on traffic safety-the only secondary effect cited by the city-was an effect which might 
have also been caused by any drive-in movie, even one that did not contain nudity. Id. at 
214-15. 
149. Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.35. Other courts interpret this footnote to mean that 
an ordinance is unconstitutional if its effect, rather than the intent, is to "suppress or 
greatly restrict" adult access to protected expression. See Comment, supra note 137, at 
nl~3. . 
150. Young, 427 U.S. at 77 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell's concern was 
that there must be a full opportunity to convey a message and a full opportunity to receive 
it. Id. at 76. He proposed a two-part inquiry for assessing the impact of the less-than-total 
restriction on protected expression: (I) whether it imposes a limit on a creator's ability to 
make material available; and (2) whether it "restrict[s] in any significant way" those who 
desire access to the protected expression. /d. at 78. 
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pact of the zoning ordinance on protected expression was "incidental 
and minimal."151 Adult theaters still had full opportunity to convey 
their message and the viewing public still had full opportunity to view 
the films. 152 
While the zoning ordinance in Young sought to preserve neigh­
borhoods by dispersing adult theaters, the zoning ordinance under re­
view in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. sought to regulate 
adult theaters by concentrating their location. 153 Reversing the deci­
sion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held 
that the Renton ordinance did not violate the first amendment because 
it did not ban adult theaters altogether. Instead, as a less-than-total 
restriction, it merely regulated where adult theaters could be 
located. 154 
Potential adult theater owners argued that the ordinance did not 
allow for "reasonable alternative avenues of communication." 155 The 
ordinance, they argued, denied them a reasonable opportunity to open 
and operate an adult theater within the city because they were ex­
cluded from ninety-five percent of the city's land. 156 The Court re­
jected this argument and implied that the remaining five percent of the 
city's land, or 520 acres, provided a reasonable and ample alternative 
for use as adult theater sites. The first amendment was not violated 
merely because the allotted land was less desirable economically.157 
Read together, Young and Renton indicate that the Court will be 
less concerned with first amendment implications when zoning regula­
151. Id. at 78 (footnote omitted). 
152. Id. at 78-79. 
153. 475 U.S. 41 (1986), reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1663 (1986). 
154. Id. at 46. Because the Renton ordinance regulated the place in which adult 
films could be displayed, the Court considered whether it was a valid time, place, and 
manner regulation. First, the Court found that the ordinance was content-neutral because 
its "predominate concern[ ]" was with the undesirable "secondary effects" of adult theatres, 
and not with the suppression of unpopular views. Id. at 47. Second, the Court found that 
the ordinance sought to serve the substantial government interest in preserving the quality 
of urban life. Id. at 50. The Court also considered whether the ordinance allowed for 
"reasonable alternative avenues of communication." Id. See infra notes 155-56 and ac­
companying text. 
155. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50. The challengers were the owners of two existing thea­
ters in Renton. They had acquired the theaters with the intent of using them as adult 
theaters but were precluded from doing so under the zoning ordinance. Id. at 45. 
156. Id. at 53. The theater owners claimed that there were no "commercially viable" 
sites available in the remaining five percent of the city land. Id. 
157. Id. at 54. Justice Brennan dissented. He argued that the ordinance imposed 
"special restrictions" on particular kinds of speech based on the content. His concern was 
that the ordinance may have been designed to suppress the content of adult movies and not 
designed to avoid the harmful "secondary effects" of adult theaters. Id. at 56-57 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
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tions limit, without suppressing, the places in which sexually explicit 
expression can occur. The Court stressed that the restrictions on loca­
tion in each case were valid because they did not suppress adult thea­
ters completely and left some locations available as potential sites for 
new theaters. Moreover, the zoning ordinances were valid because 
they were a response to the harmful secondary effects of the location of 
adult theaters and not because of viewer response to the content of the 
movies shown at the theaters. 158 
In theory, the zoning ordinances under review did not limit pro­
tected expression at its source, nor did they limit the ability of adults 
to view the protected expression. In practice, the ordinances, by re­
ducing the total number of available locations for adult theaters, lim­
ited the potential number of theaters. 159 The economic undesirability 
of the locations available under the ordinance further reduced the po­
tential number of theaters. Although the Court in Young claimed that 
the outcome would have been different if the ordinance had the "effect 
of suppressing" or "greatly restricting access to" protected expres­
sion, 160 the Court in Renton upheld a restriction that left theater own­
ers with limited options. 161 The Court, in effect, held that as long as 
there were avenues of expression available, the restrictions did not vio­
late the first amendment even if they served to reduce the total number 
of adult theaters by reducing the available locations at which the ex­
pression could take place .. 
Under this standard, display provisions are considerably less re­
strictive than the ordinances upheld in Young and Renton. Unlike the 
zoning ordinances in Young and Renton, display provisions do not re­
duce directly the availability of the material subject to regulation. In 
Young and Renton there were fewer potential outlets for expression as 
a direct result of the ordinances. Display provisions, however, result 
in an indirect reduction of outlets for sexually explicit material if 
merchants, rather than facing the burden of compliance with display 
restrictions, decide to limit their inventory to material not subject to 
regulation. It is unlikely that this reduction amounts to the functional 
equivalent of suppression or the type of significant restriction on ac­
158. In this respect, display provisions differ from the zoning regulations in Young 
and Renton. Display provisions are designed to protect juveniles from the harmful effects 
of the content of sexually explicit material and not from the harmful secondary effects that 
mayor may not be generated from open display of the material. 
159. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
160. Young. 427 U.S. at 71 n.35. 

16 t. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
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cess to protected expression that is necessary to invalidate display pro­
visions under the standards announced in Young or Renton. 
Because display provisions only alter the format in which sexually 
explicit material can be displayed, they are consistent with the ap­
proach in Pacifica which allows the restriction of a particular means of 
expression, provided that other formats for the same expression re­
main available. The Supreme Court has not viewed reductions in the 
number of outlets through which expression can take place, or the 
format through which expression can occur, as serious first amend­
ment infringements. Display provisions, in this respect, will likely 
pass constitutional muster. 
3. Increased Financial Burden 
The Supreme Court has examined regulations that impose a fi­
nancial burden on protected expression and thereby deter the exercise 
of first amendment activities. 162 Although "[t]here is no such thing as 
a free speech,"163 the first amendment offers protection against undue 
financial burdens on freedom of expression. l64 The burden imposed 
on the exercise of protected first amendment activities must be signifi­
cant in order for the regulatory scheme giving rise to the burden to be 
invalid. 165 
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, the Supreme Court invali­
dated a city ordinance that prohibited drive-in movie theaters from 
showing films containing nudity when the movie screen was visible 
from a public street or place. 166 The City of Jacksonville argued that 
the ordinance was valid because it regulated only the manner in which 
films could be shown and served the legitimate governmental interests 
of protecting citizens from "unwilling" exposure to offensive mate­
rial,167 protecting children,168 and promoting traffic safety. 169 
162. See Neisser, Charging for Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in the Market­
place ofIdeas, 74 GEO. L.J. 257 (1985). See also Central Fla. Nuclear Freeze Campaign v. 
Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1985) (conditioning the exercise of first amendment rights 
upon the payment of a substantial and unreasonable fee for additional police protection 
places an impermissible burden on the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech); 
Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group v. Powers, 723 F.2d 1050 (2d Cir. 1983) (invalidat­
ing insurance and administrative fee requirements for political march because they imposed 
a prohibitive financial burden on first amendment rights). 
163. Neisser, supra note 162, at 258. 
164. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 
U.S. 575 (1983) (state may not single out press for special use tax). 
165. United States Postal Servo v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 
127 (1981). 
166. 422 U.S. 205, 206 (1975). 
167. Id. at 208, 212. The Court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, the 
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The Supreme Court focused its analysis on the impact that the 
ordinance would have on the continued availability of movies contain­
ing even harmless forms of nudity. 170 Although the ordinance was not 
an outright ban on movies containing nudity, the net result of the ordi­
nance was to "deter drive-in theaters from showing movies containing 
any nudity ...."171 The Court found that although theater owners 
were still free to show films containing nudity if they blocked the 
screen from public view, the owners would avoid the costs of blocking 
the screen from public view by not showing certain films.l72 This de­
terrent effect of the ordinance on first amendment rights was too great. 
The Court found that "the owners and operators of these theaters are 
faced with an unwelcome choice: to avoid prosecution ... they must 
either restrict their movie offerings or construct adequate protective 
fencing which may be extremely expensive or even physically imprac­
ticable."173 The Court noted that although the deterrent effect of the 
ordinance might not result in "total suppression" of the movies subject 
to regulation, it was nevertheless an impermissible restraint on free­
dom of expression. 174 
The Minneapolis and Virginia display provisions, because of the' 
ordinance did not protect citizens from all types of movies that might be offensive. Id. at 
20S. Second, offended viewers who were able to see the screen from public or private places 
had the option not to look. Id. at 212. 
16S. Id. at 212. The Court rejected this argument because the overbreadth of the 
ordinance included films that were not obscene as to children. See infra notes 170-71 and 
accompanying text. 
169. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 214-15. The Court found that the state interest in traffic 
safety was not met by the ordinance because scenes from any movie, not only those con­
taining nudity, could be equally distracting to motorists. Id. 
Moreover, because the legislative classification focused on the subject matter or con­
tent of expression, the Court did not presume validity of the ordinance without further 
inquiry. Id. at 215. While recognizing the general rule that a municipality can enact rea­
sonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as they are "applicable to all speech 
irrespective of content," id. at 209, the Court noted that a content-based regulation might 
withstand constitutional review if there were clear reasons for the differences in treatment. 
Id. at 215. The Jacksonville ordinance was invalid because there was no justification for 
treating movies containing nudity differently from other movies in an ordinance designed to 
promote traffic safety. Id. 
170. Id. at 213. The ordinance was overbroad because it prohibited harmless forms 
of nudity that were protected as to adults and children, such as a nude baby or the nude 
body of a war victim. Id. 
171. Id.at211. 
172. Id.at21In.7. 
173. Id. at 217. Although the record did not indicate how much it would cost to 
block a theater from public view, the Court noted that in one case the cost was prohibitive. 
Id. at 211 n.S (citing Olympic Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. City of Pagedale, 441 S.W.2d 5, 9­
10 (Mo. 1969». 
174. Id. at 211 n.S. 
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increased financial burdens that they place on booksellers, may have a 
similar deterrent effect on the exercise of first amendment rights. In 
order to avoid the costs associated with complying with the display 
provisions, merchants might decide not to carry any of the material 
subject to regulation-just as the theater owners in Erznoznik might 
have decided not to show certain films in order to avoid the cost of 
blocking their screens from public view. 
Display provisions interfere with the booksellers' business prac­
tices,175 "place a heavy burden on [ some] store owners to restructure 
their stores"176 and result in financial burdens on the booksellers. If 
the merchant is required to move sexually explicit merchandise to an 
"adults only" section of the store, the merchant may have to restruc­
ture the layout of the store. This might not be practical, or even possi­
ble, in some stores because of space limitations or a selling area that 
does not lend itself to change. The merchant may decide not to 
restructure the store to accommodate an "adults only" section and, 
therefore, would be unable to openly stock the material subject to reg­
ulation. Even if the layout of a store makes an "adults only" section 
feasible, merchants may be unwilling to absorb the extra cost of re­
structuring their selling areas to establish "adults only" sections. 
Under the Minneapolis ordinance and, perhaps, the Virginia ordi­
nance, merchants who do not establish "adults only" sections would 
then be required either to discontinue offering the material subject to 
regulation, or display it with sealed wrappers or opaque covers. Both 
alternatives result in increased financial burdens. These financial bur­
dens may also deter booksellers from stocking and attempting to sell 
sexually explicit material. 
Despite the Court's willingness to consider increased costs in 
Erznoznik, the increased financial burdens associated with display pro­
visions may not give rise to the type of restriction on protected expres­
sion that violates the first amendment.177 In United States Postal 
Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations,178 the Supreme 
Court reviewed a civic association's challenge of a federal statute that 
prohibited the placement of "mailable matter" on which no postage 
175. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 802 F.2d 691, 696 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. 
granted, \07 S. Ct. 1281 (1987). 
176. Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389, 1404 
(8th Cir. 1985) (Lay, c.J., dissenting). 
177. The Court in Erznoznik considered factors other than increased financial bur­
dens when it invalidated the ordinance under review. See supra notes 167-70 and accompa­
nying text. 
178. 453 U.S. 114 (1981). 
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had been paid, in any private letterbox approved for the receipt or 
delivery of mail. 179 The civic association had a "practice of delivering 
messages to local residents by placing unstamped notices and pam­
phlets in the [private] letterboxes."18o When the local postmaster noti­
fied the association that they were in violation of federal law, the 
association sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The association 
argued that enforcement of the statute would "inhibit their communi­
cation with residents ... and would thereby deny them the freedom of 
speech secured by the First Amendment."181 
The association also argued that they were unable to afford the 
cost of postage and that the alternative of depositing their materials in 
places other than letterboxes was less effective than their usual prac­
tice. 182 The Court upheld the statute183 despite evidence that the re­
striction was "financially burdensome" on the association and that the 
alternative delivery methods constituted a "serious burden [on their] 
ability to communicate with their constituents." 184 The Court was un­
179. 18 U.S.c. § 1725 (1982). 
180. Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 116. 
181. Id. at 116-17. 
182. Id. at 134-35 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Postal Service argued that enforce­
ment of the restriction was necessary to ensure effective mail delivery and protection of the 
mails. Id. at 117-18. Moreover, it argued that the council was left with "ample alternative 
means of delivering their message," including paying postage, hanging notices on door­
knobs, placing notices under doors or doormats, telephoning residents, person-to-person 
delivery in public areas, tacking or taping notices on a door post or letterbox post, or 
placing newspaper advertisements. Id. at 119. 
183. The Court based its decision to uphold the statute on the finding that a letterbox 
is not a public forum. Id. at 128. As an "authorized depository" for the delivery and 
receipt of mail, a letterbox is not transformed into a "public forum" such as a public street 
or park, to which the first amendment guarantees unlimited access. Id. at 128-31. Prop­
erty which is not a public forum "may be subject to a prohibition of speech ... or other 
forms of communication without running afoul of the First Amendment." Id. at 131 n.7. 
The Court's emphasis on public forum analysis only served to distract the Court from 
proper consideration of the extent to which the Postal Service regulation inhibited the abil­
ity of the civic association to communicate with residents. Professors Farber and Nowak 
have argued that "[e]ven when public forum analysis is irrelevant to the outcome of a case, 
the judicial focus on the public forum concept confuses the development of first amendment 
principles." Farber & Nowak, supra note 95, at 1223. For example, in Greenburgh, the 
real issue was whether the limitation on public access "so inhibited the communication of 
ideas as to be inconsistent with the first amendment." Id. An emphasis in Greenburgh on 
public forum analysis distracted attention from proper consideration of the first amend­
ment concerns at stake. Id. 
184. Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 119-20. Hanging notices on doorknobs or doorposts 
could result in the notices being lost or damaged by the elements. Id. at 120 n.2. Weather­
stripping on doors would prevent notices from being placed under the door and the use of 
plastic bags for the protection of notices left outside would be "relatively expensive for a 
small volunteer organization." Id. (quoting Greenburgh Civic Ass'n v. United States Pos­
tal Serv., 490 F. Supp. 157,160 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). Furthermore, the relatively slow pace of 
169 1988] DISPLA Y PROVISIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
moved by the fact that none of the alternative means of delivery sug­
gested by the Postal Service were nearly as effective as placing notices 
in letterboxes. 
Unlike Erznoznik, Greenburgh suggests that the Court is uncon­
cerned about the financial burdens associated with a regulatory 
scheme that affects protected expression, as long as ample opportuni­
ties for expression still exist. Under the standard applied in Green­
burgh, the additional costs associated with display provisions would 
have to be substantial in order for the regulatory scheme to violate the 
first amendment. 
4. Restrictions Resulting in Stigmatization 
The display provisions under review in Upper Midwest 185 and 
American Booksellers 186 attach a stigma 187 to sexually explicit mate­
rial. 188 The effect of this stigma may be to deter impermissibly adults 
from seeking access to the material. In Upper Midwest, Chief Judge 
Lay observed that "many adults who would be required to unseal this 
[sexually explicit] literature in public areas in order to peruse the book 
or magazine would be embarrassed to do SO."189 He also found that 
there was a "stigma" attached to an "adults only" label. 190 Many 
adults might "forgo exercising their first amendment rights to 
purchase nonobscene literature if such material were only available" in 
"adults only" sections or stores. 191 
In Wieman v. Updegraff, Justice Black observed that "laws which 
stigmatize ... thought and speech ... have a way of reaching, ensnar­
mail delivery would, when time was of the essence, impede the ability of civic associations 
to communicate quickly with their constituents. Id. at 120. 
185. Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 (8th 
Cir. 1985). 
186. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 802 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. 
granted, 107 S. Ct. 1281 (1987). 
187. Stigma is defined as "a mark of shame or discredit" or "a mark or label indicat­
ing deviation from a norm." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2243 (14th ed. 
1961 ). 
188. The stigma associated with sexually explicit material may, of course, exist even 
without display provisions. Display provisions may merely exacerbate the degree of stigma 
involved. Moreover, stigma "has no clearly defined constitutional meaning. It reflects a 
subjective judgment that is standardless." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265, 294 n.34 (1978). 
189. Upper Midwest, 780 F.2d at 1404 (Lay, C.]., dissenting). 
190. Id. at 1402. 
191. Id. In American Booksellers, the court observed that "[m]any adults, for a vari­
ety of reasons, would not enter a display area identified as 'for adults only.''' American 
Booksellers, 802 F.2d at 696. The court, presumably, was referring to the stigma now at­
tached to sexually explicit material as a result of the "adults only" label. 
170 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:133 
ing and silencing many more people than at first intended."192 The 
Supreme Court has considered the role that stigma plays in altering 
human behavior and perceptions in a variety of settings and circum­
stances, including public education,193 prisons,194 civil proceedings, 195 
juvenile offender proceedings,. 96 and racial discrimination. 197 
In Lamont v. Postmaster General, 198 the Supreme Court reviewed 
a federal statute199 that required the Postmaster General to detain un­
sealed foreign mailings to the United States of "communist political 
propaganda."2°O Under the statute, the post office mailed the ad­
dressee a notice identifying the mail being detained and advising that 
the mail would be destroyed unless the addressee returned an attached 
reply card to the post office within twenty days.201 The Post Office 
Department assumed that those who did not return the card did not 
want to receive the identified publication or any similar 
publications.202 
The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because the 
government's imposition of an affirmative obligation on addressees­
the return of the reply card-constituted an abridgement of the ad­
dressee's first amendment rights.203 Justice Douglas, writing for the 
majority, concluded that the affirmative obligation imposed by the 
government was "almost certain to have a deterrent effect," especially 
192. 344 u.S. 183, 193 (1952) (Black, J., concurring). 
193. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,223 (1982) (Children that are denied a basic educa­
tion will be marked by the "stigma of illiteracy ... for the rest of their lives."). 
194. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473 (1983) ("Unlike disciplinary confinement 
the stigma of wrongdoing or misconduct does not attach to administrative segregation 
under Pennsylvania's prison regulations."). 
195. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 163 (1974) (Civil Service Commission post­
termination hearing procedures adequately protect federal employees from being "wrong­
fully stigmatized by untrue and unsupported administrative charges."). 
196. Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97, 107 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) 
(prohibiting, under some circumstances, the publication of the name of a juvenile charged 
as a juvenile offender transcends first amendment concerns and serves "to protect the 
young person from the stigma of his misconduct"). 
197. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980) (upholding Minority Business 
Enterprise provision which sought to remedy the present effects and stigma associated with 
past discrimination); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357-58 (1978) 
(Brennan, J., White, J., Marshall, J., and Blackman, J., concurring and dissenting) (catego­
ries based on race used to stigmatize politically powerless segments.of society are invalid). 
198. 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
199. Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962,39 U.S.c. § 4oo8(a) 
(1962). 
200. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 302-04. 
201. Id. at 303. 
202. Id. at 304. 
203. Id. at 305-07. 
171 1988] DISPLA Y PROVISIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
on tho~e with "sensitive positions."204 He emphasized that any ad­

dressee would be "likely to feel some inhibition in sending for litera­

ture" which the government had condemned as "communist political 

. propaganda. "205 The statute, because of its deterrent effect on the ex­

ercise of first amendment rights, was thus an impermissible restriction 

on the manner in which the communist publications were distrib­

uted-'--even though addressees still had complete access to the material 

by simply returning the reply card. 
The display provisions in Upper Midwest may also inhibit and de­
ter adults from obtaining protected material.. The inhibition in La­
mont arose from the stigma that the government placed on the 
material by labeling it "communist."206 At the time, when anti-com­
munist sentiment in the United States was high, the label of "commu­
nist" provided a strong deterrent to the exercise of first amendment 
rights. Display provisions, in this respect, also inhibit the exercise of 
first amendment rights. Public attention has focused on the issue of 
pornography207 and there have been increased efforts to limit access to 
pornographic materials.208 As the Court noted in American Booksell­
ers, "adults only" labels and sealed wrappers place a stigma on sexu­
ally explicit material. The stigma might deter adult access to material 
protected by the first amendment. Moreover, sealed wrapper provi­
sions may, in effect, require adults to request an inspection copy of the 
material from a merchant in order to decide whether to make the 
purchase, something that they are unaccustomed to doing. The impo­
sition of such an affirmative obligation is contrary to the holding in 
Lamont. Display provisions, like the statute in Lamont, may well be 
inconsistent with the "uninhibited, robust and wide-open" debate and 
discussion contemplated by the first amendment.209 
204. Id. at 307. 
205. Id. 
206. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 301, involved core political speech, not sexually explicit 
speech. 
207. See REP. OF THE ATT'y GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY (1986). The 
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography was chartered to "determine the nature, 
extent, and impact on society of pornography in the United States, and to make specific 
recommendations to the Attorney General concerning more effective ways in which the 
spread of pornography could be contained consistent with constitutional guarantees." Id. 
at 1957. But see also Lynn, supra note 131, at 1 ("Although their final Report [report of 
the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography] is voluminous, it is ultimately an 
unsatisfying analysis, failing to take the reader very far toward understanding what roles 
pornography plays in our culture, and why it is such a massive business enterprise. "); 
Vance, Porn in the U.S.A.: The Meese Commission on the Road, THE NATION, Aug. 2/9, 
1986 at 65. 
208. The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 23, 1986 at 11, col. I. 
209. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Political speech 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Although the Minneapolis and Virginia display provisions are un­
like the total bans on protected expression struck down in Butler and 
Schad, they may place an impermissible burden on adult access to sex­
ually explicit material. The display provisions under review in Upper 
Midwest and American Booksellers cannot be justified merely because 
they seek to protect juveniles from exposure to sexually explicit mate­
rial obscene as to juveniles. Because the material subject to regulation 
is not obscene as to adults, it becomes necessary to assess the impact of 
display provisions on adult access to the same material. 
Display provisions, as less-than-total restrictions on adult access, 
limit adult access to protected expression in several ways. If some 
merchants decide not to stock sexually explicit material-rather than 
face the burden of complying with the requirements of a display provi­
sion-there will be a reduced opportunity for adults to obtain the ma­
terial. A mere reduction in the number of outlets at which expression 
can occur, without more, is not sufficient to invalidate display provi­
sions as long as a meaningful opportunity for access remains. 2JO Simi­
larly, under the Court's approach in Pacifica, a restriction that merely 
limits the format through which expression can take place does not 
provide sufficient grounds to invalidate the regulation. 
Display provisions also impose a financial burden on protected 
expression by increasing the cost of distributing and purchasing sexu­
ally explicit material. The increased financial burdens associated with 
display provisions may deter adult access to material that adults are 
entitled to obtain under the first amendment. Financial burdens, how­
ever, must be substantial in order for the regulatory scheme under re­
view to violate the first amendment. Although a reduction in the 
number of outlets at which protected expression can occur and the 
increased financial burdens associated with display provision are not 
sufficient to invalidate a display provision, at least two other burdens 
associated with the provisions are significant under standards drawn 
from previous cases. 
Because the way in which a publication is displayed is directly 
related to a store owner's ability to sell the material, opaque cover 
requirements and sealed wrapper provisions restrict a "uniquely valua­
may, of course, be entitled to greater protection than non-obscene, sexually explicit expres­
sion. See supra note 46. This distinction, however, does not mean that substantial burdens 
placed on sexually explicit expression do not violate the first amendment. See supra note 
129. 
210. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text. 
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ble" and "important" mode of communication under the standard an­
nounced in Vincent and Linmark. The display alternatives available 
to merchants in Minneapolis and Virginia are not "ample alternative 
channels for communication."211 Moreover, display provisions stigma­
tize sexually explicit material. The combined effect of these burdens 
on expression protected under the first amendment presents a serious 
case for invalidating the display provisions under review in Upper 
Midwest and American Booksellers. 
Samuel D. Friedlander 
21\. Linmark, 431 U.S. at 93 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976». 
